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In this paper we propose an artiﬁcial market where multiple risky assets are exchanged. Agents
are constrained by the availability of resources and trade to adjust their portfolio according to
an exogenously given target portfolio. We model the trading mechanism as a continuous
auction order-driven market. Agents are heterogeneous in terms of desired target portfolio
allocations, but they are homogeneous in terms of trading strategies. We investigate the
role played by the trading mechanism in aﬀecting the dynamics of prices, trading volume
and volatility. We show that the institutional setting of a double auction market is suﬃcient
to generate a non-normal distribution of price changes and temporal patterns that
resemble those observed in real markets. Moreover, we highlight the role played by the
interaction between individual wealth constraints and the market frictions associated
with a double auction system to determine the negative asymmetry of the stock returns
distribution.
1. Introduction
We analyse the dynamics of the price formation process
of a set of ﬁnancial securities through the construction
of an artiﬁcial continuous auction order-driven ﬁnancial
market with heterogeneous agents who trade to adjust
their portfolio according to a target portfolio.
The dynamics of a ﬁnancial market depends on the
interactions between the rules deﬁning the trading
mechanism and the behavioural assumptions about
the agents’ population. Building an artiﬁcial market
means to determine the trading rules that deﬁne the
price formation process and to specify the trading
strategies followed by the agents.
In recent years this methodology has gathered increas-
ing attention in order to explain the statistical properties
of empirical ﬁnancial time series. Research in ﬁnance has
produced a wide empirical evidence showing that devia-
tions from the standard assumptions (stationary and IID
normally distributed ﬁnancial time series) are common
and cannot be considered exceptional deviations from
the standard model. A number of regularities (or stylized
facts) have been observed, such as fat tails and excess
kurtosis of the short-term log-returns distribution, persis-
tence of volatility and of trading volume, and cross-cor-
relations between volatility and trading volume (see
Karpoﬀ 1987, Gallant et al. 1992, Pagan 1996,
Campbell et al. 1997, Engle and Patton 2001). This
empirical evidence opened two fundamental research
areas. First, a growing eﬀort has been devoted to search
for statistical models that can ﬁt the data and, thus, pro-
vide a good description of the standard patterns observed
in ﬁnancial series. Second, it became essential to under-
stand what generates the common characteristics of ﬁnan-
cial time series and, ultimately, to develop economic
models capable of generating the complex behaviour
that is observed. In particular, it became important to
explain how the institutional setting in which agents inter-
act, and the agents behavioural characteristics, aﬀect
market results.
Artiﬁcial market models are eﬀective tools of analysis
for identifying the set of elements needed to mimic
the structure and the patterns of empirically observed
ﬁnancial time series. Using numerical simulation, they
make it possible to analyse the impact of systems of inter-
actions which would otherwise be analytically intractable.
Namely, they allow to overcome the necessary simplifying
assumptions of theoretical models (such as the need to
restrict the analysis to cases with representative agents),*Corresponding author. Email: consiglio@unipa.it
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and they open the possibility of studying the eﬀect of the
simultaneous interaction of alternative market designs
and heterogeneous agents on price dynamics.
Previous agent-based simulators focused their attention
on analysing the impact of groups of agents following
diﬀerent trading strategies (see LeBaron 1999,
Routledge 1999, Brock et al. 2001, Chen et al. 2001,
Chiarella and He 2001, LeBaron 2001, Farmer and
Joshi 2002). Typically, the interaction between value
traders (or fundamentalists) and trend chasers is studied
in a single risky asset economy characterized by a price
functional implicitly based on a batch clearing system, or
by a trading system generally based on a market-makery.
The basic intuition supported in these studies is that
fundamentalists act as price stabilizers, by reducing the
amplitude of price excursions, while trend chasers tend to
amplify shocks. It has been shown that the interplay
of these two groups of agents can induce short term
non-normal price ﬂuctuations, and can generate temporal
patterns consistent with the statistical properties of the
time series observed in real markets. These results suggest
that the existence and permanence in the market of
irrational or bounded rational traders is suﬃcient to
explain the empirical evidence.
Recently, the role played by the set of rules governing
the trading process has received growing attention.
Agent-based simulations have embedded more realistic
institutional settings and special attention has been
devoted to analysing the impact of order-driven
markets, either structured as continuous auction or as
call auction systems (see Raberto et al. 2001, Chiarella
and Iori 2002, Daniels et al. 2003, Li Calzi and
Pellizzari 2003).
In a double auction order-driven market agents submit
their request sequentially and transactions occur when
two agents can match their request at a given price.
Therefore, whenever an agent cannot ﬁnd an opposite
matching order, or the size of the matching order
is lower than the required quantity, the agent will
be rationed. Rationing has important consequences in
terms of price dynamics. As underlined by Li Calzi and
Pellizzari (2003), the continuous auction system increases
the probability that incoming orders remain partly or
totally unexecuted. Prices may not adjust to fully
incorporate information/shocks as expressed by the
trading requests, and they may tend to be stickier and
to generate returns more concentrated around the mean.
In addition, rationing may increase the probability of
having sequences of traders on the same side of the
market, and that in turn may imply a higher frequency
of extreme price movements with respect to the average
price change. Moreover, temporal patterns of dependence
in ﬁnancial time series may arise because rationed agents
will keep on trying to satisfy their trading needs in
subsequent trading sessions. The impact of rationing
can be emphasized by introducing a more realistic setting
where agents are subject to liquidity constraints. In such a
case, agents’ trading wishes can remain unsatisﬁed not
only because of the lack of adequate opposite matching
orders, but also because of the insuﬃciency of the
available resources. Rationing may also occur in markets
based on a batch clearing system, that is in markets where
call auctions occur at regular time intervals during the
trading day. Yet the phenomenon will tend to be less
pervasive than in double auction market and, more
importantly, it will not depend on the sequence of orders’
arrival.
At this time, the analyses modelling explicitly the
functioning of order-driven markets have provided some
support to the conjecture that the ﬁne structure of the
trading mechanism plays an important role in determin-
ing the characteristics of ﬁnancial time series.
Bak et al. (1997), Maslov (2000) and Li Calzi and
Pellizzari (2003) model a double auction trading mechan-
ism and show that the non-normality of the distribution
of short term log-returns appears even when the market is
populated by only one type of agent (typically pure noise
traders or value traders). Raberto et al. (2001) model a
call auction market and introduce an opinion propaga-
tion system that randomly creates clusters of agents
trading on the same side of the market. They ﬁnd both
fat tails in the density of short term log-returns and
volatility clustering in an artiﬁcial market with cash
constrained noise traders, where agents submit buy or
sell orders at limit prices dependent on past volatility.
Their results depend on the mechanism inducing clusters
of agents trading on the same side of the market and on
the explicit connection imposed between current limit
prices and past volatility.
The aim of our paper is to model an agent-based
artiﬁcial market with a detailed representation of a
continuous auction order-driven system, where multiple
risky assets are exchangedz. Agents, constrained by the
available resources, trade to rebalance their portfolio.
Agents are heterogeneous because they have to realize
diﬀerent target portfolio allocations, but they are
homogeneous in terms of their trading strategies.
We build two diﬀerent settings. In the ﬁrst setting,
agents are automatically rationed whenever they cannot
realize their orders at current market conditions. In the
second setting, we leave to the agents the possibility of
choosing between posting market orders, at increasingly
unfavourable conditions, and being rationed (and run the
risk to remain rationed) but get more favourable trading
terms in the case of a future trade. We make the assump-
tion that the order submission strategy depends on the
market conditions revealed by the order book structure.
This setting represents a ﬁrst step to make agents’
behaviour dependent on market information. Agents
will use the public information observable through the
yAdditionally, agents’ wealth is assumed unlimited (no liquidity constraints).
zTo our knowledge the only other paper where multiple risky assets are introduced is Cincotti et al. (2003). In their simulations
the authors use the call auction market structure deﬁned in Raberto et al. (2001).
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system (prices and volumes of the orders stored in the
book) to infer order ﬂow and price dynamics. In recent
years, the diﬀusion of electronic limit order book systems
has generated a growing literature analysing the links
between the information observed through the system
by traders, order placement behaviour and price dynamics
(see Parlour 1998, Hall and Hautsch 2004, Handa et al.
2003, Ranaldo 2004). Based on the insights provided
by this new research area, we expand our ﬁrst setting,
where both order ﬂow and order type are exogenously
determined, making order-type placement endogenous
and dependent on the state of the book. In this way we
introduce an explicit feedback mechanism between the
intensity of rationing and price dynamics. We show that
the state of the book provides an implicit coordination
device inducing agents to supply liquidity (that is to
submit limit orders) when the market needs it.
Correspondingly, the rationing produced by the trading
mechanism will be less intense, making both the non-
normality of the distribution of daily log-returns and
the persistence of volatility less pronounced.
The extension to multiple risky asset is important for
understanding the interactions between the budget
constraint and the rationing eﬀect induced by a double
auction trading mechanism. When agents’ purchases are
limited by the available wealth and agents’ portfolios are
composed of multiple risky securities, at each moment in
time, the agents’ ability to satisfy their trading needs
becomes related to market-wide conditions. Speciﬁcally,
the realization of buy orders for the ith asset will depend
not only on the liquidity of the corresponding sell side of
the order book, but also on the liquidity of the buy sides
of the order books of the other risky assets. We show that,
ceteris paribus, an increase in the number of assets traded
in the market makes the distribution of daily log-returns
more asymmetric around the mean. The negative skew-
ness of the unconditional distribution of stock returns has
been investigated empirically and assumed in many ﬁnan-
cial models (see Kraus and Litzemberger 1976, Cont
2001, Engle and Patton 2001, Hong and Stein 2003,
Peiro` 2004). In all the simulations we run we observe
that the very largest price movements in the market are
usually decrements rather than increments. Moreover, we
ﬁnd that the negative skewness of the distribution of stock
returns becomes more pronounced when the parameters
of the model are calibrated to generate more rationing.
Our analysis suggests that the interaction of individual
wealth constraints and the constraints imposed by the
evolution of market liquidity plays an important role in
making equity returns negatively skewed.
Finally, the multiple assets framework allow us to study
the correlation structure of stock returns. We ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cant positive correlations that increase in the settings
where the rationing induced by the trading mechanism is
stronger. We conjecture that the detected correlation
structure is driven by positive wealth eﬀects due to the
traders’ objective to maintain a well-balanced portfolio.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the market structure and the assumptions made in terms of
agents’ behaviour. Section 3 presents the calibration used
for our simulations and discusses the results obtained.
Section 4 concludes and describes future developments.
2. The model
2.1. The market microstructure
We use the following notation.
M number of agents, with i ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,M.
N number of risky assets, with j ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,N.
T number of trading days, with t ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,T .
K number of time steps within trading day,
with k ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,K .
Cti (k) amount of cash available at time step k,
within the trading day t, and for trader i.
Ptj(k) price of risky asset j, at time step k, within
the trading day t. Either the last transaction
price or the last midquote if at the previous
time step a midquote change occurred.
BtjðkÞ best bid price for asset j, at time step k,
within the trading day t.
AtjðkÞ best ask price for asset j, at time step k,
within the trading day t.
Wti (k) total wealth for trader i, at time step k,
within the trading day t.
xtijðkÞ number of shares of risky asset j, held by
trader i, at time step k, within the trading
day t.
hijðt, tþ Þ target portfolio allocations for all assets
including cash ( j ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,N þ 1), for
trader i, from period t to tþ .
qtijðkÞ number of units of asset j that agent i is will-
ing to trade at time step k and trading day t.
We model an economy with M agents where N risky
assets are exchanged, and the risk-free asset pays a zero
yearly interest rate. The risk-free asset plays the role of
cash available to the agents to satisfy their liquidity needs
and its price is set equal to one.
We assume that borrowing and short selling are not
allowed, therefore, hijðt, tþ Þ  0 and xtijðkÞ  0. Agents
allocate their total wealth entirely among the available
assets, including cash, so we have that
XNþ1
j¼1
hijðt, tþ Þ ¼ 1: ð1Þ
Agents get equal initial endowments in the Nþ 1
existing securities. Given market prices PtjðkÞ  0, the
individual total wealth at each moment in time is
Wti ðkÞ ¼ Cti ðkÞ þ
XN
j¼1
xtijðkÞPtjðkÞ for all i ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,M:
ð2Þ
We randomly assign to each agent target portfolio allo-
cations representing the fractions of total wealth that each
agent desires to allocate in the existing securities. Given
the restriction of non-negative portfolio allocations and
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given that portfolio allocations must exhaust all the
available wealth, the set of target portfolios is given by
D  fh: h01 ¼ 1, h  0g: ð3Þ
To generate portfolios on the Nþ 1 dimensional
simplex D, we generate the target allocations as uniform
variates Dirichlet (1, . . . , 1; 1) (see Gentle 1998). At regu-
lar time intervals we extract a subgroup of all agents and
we assign to the agents of the group new target alloca-
tions. The duration of the assigned target allocations, , is
not deﬁned ex-ante, but depends on the random sequence
of extraction of each group.
Agents trade to rebalance their portfolio. At each
moment in time they trade to adjust their portfolio
according to their target allocations. We can interpret
the change in agents’ desired portfolio composition as
the result of individual shocks (such as endowments
shocks) hitting agents at random times, or as the result
of the arrival of information of private interest (i.e. infor-
mation about personal inventory costs, or about a private
investment opportunity). As a consequence our agents
can be regarded as uninformed or noise/liquidity traders.
At time step k, the number of units of the jth asset that
the ith agent is willing to trade is given by
qtijðkÞ ¼
hijðt, tþ ÞWti ðkÞ  xtijðkÞPtjðkÞ
PtjðkÞ0
$ %
, ð4Þ
where bc denotes the integer part and PtjðkÞ0 is the eﬀec-
tive price at which the transaction can be executed
(respectively the best bid for sell orders and the best ask
for buy orders). If qtijðkÞ > 0, the trader issues a buy order;
if qtijðkÞ < 0, the trader issues a sell order.
Traders enter the market sequentially. At each time
step k, we randomly extract (with replacement) one
agent to enter the market. The selected agent will enter
the market, and he will post his orders, if PiðE Þ is greater
than a random number drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion over the ½0, 1 interval. The probability PiðE Þ is an
increasing function of the total imbalance between the
target and the current portfolio,
PiðE Þ ¼ f ðiÞ ð5Þ
and
i ¼
XNþ1
j¼1
hij 
xtijðkÞPtjðkÞ
Wti ðkÞ

:
The activation function PiðE Þ reﬂects the urgency of
trading for the candidate agent. Agents are more impati-
ent to trade, the more distant is their current wealth
allocation from their target portfolioy. Correspondingly,
the ﬁltering device PiðE Þ makes the eﬀective probability
of entering the market dependent on the portfolio’s
imbalancez.
When a trader enters the market he faces an exchange
book with orders to buy and to sell. Agents can trade
immediately at the prevailing quote placing market
orders, or they can submit limit orders that are stored in
the exchange book and will be executed if matching
orders arrive before the end of the trading day. Limit
orders will be executed using ﬁrst price priority and
then time precedence. At each moment in time the
exchange book shows all the orders that have been issued
up to that time and that have not found a matching order.
The book is divided in a buy side and a sell side. For each
order, the order size, the limit price and the posting time
are reported. The limit price is the maximum price that a
buyer is willing to pay to purchase the listed quantity for a
buy order, and the minimum price that a seller is willing
to accept to sell the signed quantity for a sell order.
At each moment in time the best/quoted bid , BtjðkÞ, is
the highest limit buy price, that is the best price at
which a seller can sell units of the asset. Conversely, the
best/quoted ask , AtjðkÞ, is the lowest limit ask price, which
is the best price at which a buyer can acquire units of the
asset. Arriving orders are matched giving precedence to
the registered orders with the best limit prices, and
between orders with the same limit price, giving priority
to the order with the lowest posting time.
Each day the opening price is the last spot price of the
previous day. The spot price at each time step k is either
the last transaction price or the last midquote, if a change
in the quotes occurred. Prices are discrete and, during
each trading day, the minimum tick size change depends
on the daily opening price. At the end of the trading day
all orders are cancelled.
2.2. Agents’ behaviour
We introduce the following notation to describe the
agents’ strategies:
Ptj, bðkÞ buying price of risky asset j, at time step k,
within the trading day t;
Ptj, sðkÞ selling price of risky asset j, at time step k,
within the trading day t;
MNtiðkÞ amount of money necessary to trade at
time step k, within the trading day t, and
for trader i;
yThe relation between the urgency to trade and the size of the portfolio’s imbalance can be explained as the result of the existence of
ﬁxed direct or indirect trading costs (such as a ﬁxed fee that must be paid to access the market or the costs associated with the effort
(and time)) needed to monitor and to adjust the portfolio’s deviations.
zGiven that in our model agents trade to reach a target portfolio, we introduce a device to transform a sequential random arrival
process in an arrival process reﬂecting the agents’ need for trading. We could have achieved the same result ordering, at each time
step k, all the agents on the basis of i, and then selecting the agents following that sequence. We have opted for the two step
ﬁltering procedure to minimize the computational burden. Clearly, with respect to a setting where the agents’ arrival in the market is
totally random, we are affecting the order-size distribution. Truncation from below generally increases the mean and decreases the
dispersion of the probability distribution, therefore we can expect a similar effect on the mean and the dispersion of the order-type
distribution.
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MAtiðkÞ amount of money available for trading at
time step k, within the trading day t, and
for trader i;
QtjðkÞ number of units of asset j available at the
current quote, at time step k, and trading
day t;
t minimum tick size for trading day t;
 upper bound on price deviation.
Agents trade to rebalance their portfolios subject to a
budget constraint. We analyse two settings where agents
adopt diﬀerent order submission strategies: the simple
trading and the simple trading with book analysis.
In the ﬁrst setting the only order submission criterion
is immediacy. The traders’ objective is to satisfy their
trading needs as soon as possible, thus they will submit
market orders to buy (sell) at the current best ask (bid) for
the quantities they need to trade. Limit orders are used
only if for some j the corresponding qtijðkÞ is greater than
the quantity available at the current quote. In this case the
agent places a market order for the quantity available,
and for the residual quantity, given by qtijðkÞ QtjðkÞ, he
will submit a limit order to buy or to sell depending on the
sign of qtijðkÞ. The associated limit price will be such that
the order will be ﬁrst on the appropriate side of the book,
so we have that
Ptj, bðkÞ ¼ BtjðkÞ þ t, ð6Þ
P tj, s ðkÞ ¼ AtjðkÞ  t: ð7Þ
When there are no orders on the relevant side of the
book to match with, the agent will place directly a limit
order for the whole quantity needed, qtijðkÞ, at a price that
will make him ﬁrst on the booky.
Since borrowing and short-selling are not allowed, the
agent’s orders can be submitted only if the money needed
to realize those trades is not greater than the money avail-
able. Let I jfAgðkÞ be an indicator variable denoting for each
risky asset j if the agent wants to issue an order. The event
A can be a market order to buy (MB), a limit order to buy
(LB), or a market order to sell (MS). To simplify the
notation we drop the superscript indicating the trading
day, then we can write:
MNiðkÞ ¼
XN
j¼1
I jfMBgðkÞq0jðkÞAjðkÞ
þ
XN
j¼1
I jfLBgðkÞ qijðkÞ  q0jðkÞ
 
Pj;bðkÞ; ð8Þ
MAiðkÞ ¼ CiðkÞ  h*i;Nþ1ðkÞWiðkÞ þ
XN
j¼1
I jfMSgðkÞq0jðkÞBjðkÞ;
ð9Þ
where q0jðkÞ ¼ minfqijðkÞ,QjðkÞg and hi,Nþ1ðkÞ is the target
cash allocation for the ith agent.
Note that, MNiðkÞ is given by the amount of money
necessary for market buy orders plus the amount of
money required for limit buy orders, while, MAiðkÞ is
equal to the amount of cash in excess of the target frac-
tion of total wealth to keep as cash, plus the amount of
money the agent can obtain from the sale of assets at
market conditions. We do not include the money that
could be realized through limit orders to sell because
with respect to those orders the agent does not know if
and when they will ﬁnd a matching order. When agents
submit their trades they must have in their hands all the
money necessary to cover current expenses (the total
value of market orders to buy) and future planned
expenses (the total value of limit orders to buy
submitted). If MNiðkÞ MAiðkÞ, then all the orders
that the agent wants to issue will be submitted. If
MNiðkÞ > MAiðkÞ, then for each asset j the number of
units to trade are scaled down until MNiðkÞ ¼ MAiðkÞ.
The quantity adjustment keeps constant, with respect
to the total, the percentage of money to allocate in
each assetz.
The adjustments imposed by the budget constraint are
performed giving priority to the submission of market
orders to buy. If some money remains available after all
market orders to buy have been processed, the procedure
to check for the availability of money for submitting the
desired limit orders to buy is started. Otherwise, the limit
orders to buy are all cancelled.
In the simple trading with book analysis we allow agents
to choose their order submission strategy. As in the
previous setting, agents trade to rebalance their portfolio
and they want to satisfy their trading needs as soon as
possible. But, instead of imposing an automatic rationing,
we allow agents to make their order submission strategy
dependent on market conditions, as inferred from the
public information revealed in the book. With respect
to the previous setting, we are moving a step forward
endogenizing the order-type placement.
In recent years, the relationship between the state of
the limit order book of an order-driven market and the
traders’ order placement strategies has been studied both
theoretically and empirically (see Parlour 1998, Hall and
Hautsch 2004, Handa et al. 2003, Ranaldo 2004).
Parlour (1998) develops a dynamic model of an order-
driven market where traders can trade immediately by
submitting market orders or choose a better price at
the risk of non-execution by submitting limit orders.
She shows that, even in the absence of asymmetric infor-
mation and with a random arrival of traders types,
yThe order fractioning rule that we impose is necessary to maintain a viable market with a regular ﬂow of market and limit orders.
In fact, an economy entirely populated by uninformed traders driven by liquidity needs (placing market orders until exhaustion of
the orders stored in the book) will produce a degenerate market where one of the two sides of the book is systematically empty.
In any case, the very simple rule of transforming ‘excess’ market orders in limit orders is not unusual in a real market. For instance,
this is the procedure used in the electronic Milan Stock Exchange.
zFor each asset, the number of shares to purchase is computed as the integer part of the product of the original number of shares
and the ratio between the money available and the money needed. The residual generated by the rounding procedure is
automatically converted in cash.
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the optimal order strategy of individual agents depends
on the state of the book (both sides of the book are
determinant) and on the inferences about future order
ﬂow based on the current book. The important implica-
tion of the model is that the limit book provides a link
between order ﬂows in successive periods, and systematic
patterns in transaction data will be observed.
Precisely, the thicker the bid (ask) side of the book and
the thinner the ask (bid) side, the lower is the execution
probability of a buy (sell) limit order. Therefore, traders
are more likely to submit market orders when their own
side of the book is thicker and the opposite side of the
book is thinner.
Handa et al. (2003) model the price formation in a
non-intermediated order-driven market with asymmetric
information about the asset value. In their model the
thickness of the buy and sell sides of the book is a
proxy of the proportion of high and low valuation traders
respectively. A higher proportion of high value (low
value) investors raises the buy (sell) competition, making
the execution probability of a limit buy (sell) order lower
and a buy (sell) market order more attractive.
The empirical evidence is supporting the general
hypothesis that trading behaviour is aﬀected by the
state of the book (see Hall and Hautsch 2003, Ranaldo
2004). In particular, a signiﬁcant positive relation has
been detected between market order submission and
proxies measuring the diﬀerential thickness of the same
side relative to the opposite side of the book.
Following these insights, we deﬁne a setting where
agents use the information contained in the book to
solve the trade-oﬀ between immediacy and price improve-
ment. The ﬁrst order submission criterion is immediacy:
agents try to satisfy their trading needs at current market
conditions submitting market orders (to buy or to sell) for
the qijðkÞ: When the number of shares to trade is greater
than the quantity available at the current quote, agents
can choose between trading the residual quantity using
market orders and submitting a limit order at a more
favourable price.
Agents estimate the schedules relating cumulated
buy/sell volumes to the corresponding bid/ask prices by
ﬁtting a linear relationship, using ordinary least squares
(OLS). If all the orders were collected in the book, the
estimated schedules would represent the market demand
and supply curves. The price at which the two schedules
intersect would be the equilibrium price, PEj ðkÞ, that is the
price at which the highest number of shares of the jth
asset could be traded. In our market the orders stored
in the book are the orders that cannot be satisﬁed because
the corresponding reservation prices are not compatible
with the terms of trade expressed by the opposite side
of the market (i.e. whenever Pj, sðkÞ  Pj, bðkÞ a matching
will occur). Arriving market orders sequentially remove
orders from the opposite side of the book. Thus, we can
interpret the estimated schedules, starting from the
current quotes, as the truncated unsatisﬁed demand and
supply curves given current market conditions. The price
PEj ðkÞ is the limit price starting from which, for any given
volume, the terms of trade of buyers and sellers do not
allow any exchange (AjðkÞ>BjðkÞ). The proxy used by
our agents, to combine information provided by the
book with inferences about the order ﬂow, is the
diﬀerential distance between the current quotes and
the reference price PEj ðkÞ. Let us denote by zBj ðkÞ and
zAj ðkÞ, respectively, the distance between the reference
price and the current bid, and the distance between the
current ask and the reference price,
zBj ðkÞ ¼ PEj ðkÞ  BjðkÞ; ð10Þ
zAj ðkÞ ¼ AjðkÞ  PEj ðkÞ: ð11Þ
The order submission strategy will work as follows.
(i) zBj ðkÞ > zAj ðkÞ, agents infer that in the market there is
more selling than buying. A buyer will choose to
trade the residual quantity submitting a limit order
to buy at an improved price,
Pj, bðkÞ ¼ BjðkÞ j, ð12Þ
where
j ¼ z
B
j ðkÞ  zAj ðkÞ if zBj ðkÞ  zAj ðkÞ < ,
 if zBj ðkÞ  zAj ðkÞ  :
(
A seller will choose to trade the residual quantity
submitting market orders until there are limit orders
to buy to match with (she will walk down the bid
book). She will issue a limit order to sell, at a price
such that she will be ﬁrst on the book, only if a
residual quantity remains after all limit orders to
buy existing in the book have been matched.
(ii) zBj ðkÞ < zAj ðkÞ, agents infer that in the market there is
more buying than selling. A seller will choose to
trade the residual quantity submitting a limit order
to sell at an improved price,
Pj, sðkÞ ¼ AjðkÞ þj , ð13Þ
where,
j ¼
zBj ðkÞ  zAj ðkÞ
  if zBj ðkÞ  zAj ðkÞ  < ,
 if zBj ðkÞ  zAj ðkÞ
   :
8<
:
A buyer will keep on submitting market orders to
match with existing sell limit orders (he will walk
up the ask book). He will issue a limit order to
buy, at a price such that he will be ﬁrst on the bid
book, only if a residual quantity remains after all sell
limit orders in the book have been matched.
(iii) zBj ðkÞ ¼ zAj ðkÞ, agents cannot make any inference
about the prevalent direction of the order ﬂow. In
this case they will trade the residual quantity posting
limit orders at prices such that they will be ﬁrst on
the book.
When the buy and sell schedules cannot be estimated,
because there are less than two limit orders on at least one
side of the book, agents make their inferences about
market conditions comparing cumulated ask and bid
volumes. The budget constraint operates as in the
previous setting, giving priority to market orders when
an adjustment is necessary.
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3. Simulation results
We run our simulationsy with a population of
M ¼ 10 000 potentially active traders, T¼ 5000 trading
days and N ¼ 1, 3, 6 risky assets. Each trading day is
divided in K¼ 360 time steps corresponding, approxi-
mately, to a trading day of six hours, assuming a time
step k equal to one minute. Each agent gets an initial
endowment in cash equal to the market capitalization
divided for the total number of agents in the market
MC=Mð Þ. The individual starting endowments in each
of the N stocks of our economy are set equal to 50 shares.
Initial prices are set equal to E100. Agents are divided in
G equally sized groups with G ¼ 10, 20, 50. Every I days,
with I ¼ 10, 20, 30, 40, one group is randomly extracted
and all the agents in the selected group get new target
allocations hijðt, tþ Þ. Target allocation vectors, hi , are
sampled from a Dirichlet(1, . . . ,1;1). For the ith trader,
the probability of entering the market, PiðE Þ ¼ f ðiÞ, is
determined as followsz,
f : ½0, 2 ! ½0, 1 ð14Þ
with
f ðiÞ ¼
0:5i if 0  i  0:3,
1:83 ði  0:3Þ þ 0:15 if 0:3 < i  0:6,
0:75 ði  0:6Þ þ 0:7 if 0:6 < i  1,
1 if i > 1:
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
We use two diﬀerent ways to assign new target alloca-
tions: the uniform and the non-uniform updating. In the
uniform case, the new target allocations are equal for all
the agents in the group. We extract a new allocation
vector for the ﬁrst agent of the selected group and then
we assign the same allocation vector to all the other
agents in the group. In the non-uniform case, we extract
a diﬀerent allocation vector for all the agents in the
group. The minimum tick size is 1% of the opening
daily price, while we set the upper bound on price change
equal to ﬁve ticks. See table 1 for a summary of the
parameters used in the simulations.
3.1. Analysis of the short term log-returns distribution
We choose a standard parameters’ calibration where
G¼ 20, I¼ 40 and N¼ 3. In ﬁgure 1 we plot the typical
daily time series of prices, volume and volatility generated
in the simple trading and in the simple trading with book
analysis under the two scenarios of uniform and non-
uniform updating§. We systematically discard the ﬁrst
1000 observations to avoid spurious eﬀects due to the
initialization of the simulations. The daily price series
reports for each day the last transaction price registered
during the trading day. Daily volatility is deﬁned as the
squared ﬁrst diﬀerence in the daily log-prices.
At ﬁrst inspection, it seems that the main diﬀerence in
the behaviour of prices over time is due to the technique
used to update target allocations. In fact, in both settings,
when we move from non-uniform to uniform updating
we get (i) price series with a higher range of variation
and (ii) price series showing some trends over time and
less pronounced continuous up and down movements.
Furthermore, in the case of uniform updating, the
yThe artiﬁcial market is implemented using Cþþ language, with MatClass libraries (Birchenhall, 1993).
zThe total portfolio’s imbalance reaches the maximum when the agent’s wealth is entirely allocated on one asset and it must be
reallocated on another asset (in this case, the sum in absolute value of the changes occurred will be two). The probability function we
specify yields a stretched S-shaped function. We choose this functional form because of its ﬂexibility. The function is calibrated to
obtain an entering probability equal to one when the total imbalance is at least 50%.
§We show the series corresponding to a single asset generated in a three risky assets economy under the speciﬁed combination of
parameters.
Table 1. Simulation parameters. The symbol denotes an independent draw from a probability distribution.
Number of agents M ¼ 10000
Number of risky assets N ¼ 1, 3, 6
Number of trading days T ¼ 5000
Number of daily time steps K ¼ 360
Initial cash endowments
C1i ð1Þ ¼
MC
M
i ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,M
Initial endowments of risky assets x1ijð1Þ ¼ 50 i ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,M
j ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,N
Initial prices P1j ð1Þ ¼E100 j ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,N
Number of groups G ¼ 10, 20, 50
Interval for updating allocation vectors I ¼ 10, 20, 30, 40 days
Target allocation vectors hi  Dirichletð1, . . . , 1; 1Þ i ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,M
Tick size t ¼ 1% opening price
Entering probability
f ðiÞ ¼
0:5i
1:83 ði  0:3Þ þ 0:15
0:75 ði  0:6Þ þ 0:7
1
8>><
>>:
if 0  i  0:3
if 0:3 < i  0:6
if 0:6 < i  1
if i > 1
Upper bound on price changes  ¼ 5t
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temporal pattern of price changes appears much more
concentrated on small values with the occurrence of single
high spikes.
When we look at the shape of the distribution of daily
stock returns, we observe that all our series show evidence
of excess kurtosis and negative skewness. In all the
simulations the Shapiro–Wilk test rejects normality at a
signiﬁcance level less than 1%y.
To highlight the behaviour of the tails of the distribu-
tion, in ﬁgure 2 we show the cumulative distribution of
the standardized log-returns. We use the absolute value
of the standardized log-returns in order to merge the
positive and negative tail. In all cases there is evidence
of fat tails with some important diﬀerences. The non-
normality is more pronounced in the cases of uniform
updating and, independently of the method used to
change target allocations, in the simple trading setting.
We check for the robustness of these results, with
respect to the parameters specifying the updating time
interval and the number of groups. To this end, we run
for each parameters’ combination (G ¼ 10, 20, 50 and
I ¼ 10, 20, 30, 40) a set of simulations corresponding
to ten diﬀerent seed numbers. For suﬃciently long
updating time intervals, we reject the normality
hypothesis, and the daily standardized log-returns
show fat tails, excess kurtosis and negative skewness. To
gather some insights about the factors driving the
observed phenomena, we analyse the change in the beha-
viour of the series related to diﬀerent combinations of
the parameters. In ﬁgures 3 and 4 we report the values
of the total tail’s slope, corresponding to the simple
and the book-analysis setting in the two updating
regimes.
The comparative analysis highlights some interesting
patterns.
(i) There is a clear trend towards more pronounced fat
tails associated with longer time-intervals between
one updating and the other.
(ii) In the uniform updating regime, the deviations from
normality become stronger the lower the number of
groups.
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Figure 1. Daily time series of prices, volume and volatility for the diﬀerent settings. From the upper-left to the right-bottom panel
(clockwise), we have: simple trading with non-uniform updating (STNU), simple trading with uniform updating (STU), book
analysis with non-uniform updating (BANU) and book analysis with uniform updating (BAU).
yOver twenty simulations for each market setting (maintaining G ¼ 20 and I ¼ 40), the kurtosis statistic is consistently higher in the
uniform updating regime and in the simple trading setting. Equivalently, the skewness coefﬁcient becomes more negative in the
uniform case and in the simple trading setting.
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(iii) For each combination of parameters, the deviations
from normality are more evident in the uniform than
in the non-uniform setting.
(iv) The above patterns are general, but in the book-
analysis framework, we observe an attenuation of
the deviations from normality.
The identiﬁed patterns make clear the role played by
the heterogeneity of the population in aﬀecting the shape
of log-returns distribution.
In the uniform updating setting, at each updating time,
we assign the same target allocations to all the agents in
the selected group. Clearly in this case, the lower the
number of groups and the longer the time interval
between one updating and the other, the lower is the
degree of heterogeneity of the agents’ population. When
the population is more homogeneous, the probability of
having sequences of agents on the same side of the market
increases. Since in a double auction market trading
requests can be satisﬁed only if they ﬁnd an opposite
matching order, the trading mechanism will tend to pro-
duce an accumulation of unsatisﬁed orders on one side of
the book. That in turn, will tend to generate more fre-
quent extreme price changesy. In the non-uniform setting,
the impact of changing the number of groups on the
degree of heterogeneity of the population is less evidentz,
while typically the lower is the updating frequency the
stronger are the deviations from normality. In the book
yThe price dynamics induced by this trading mechanism is strictly related to the sequences of order ﬂow (in terms of direction, buy
or sell, and size). A well-balanced population, where 50% of the agents are buyers and the remaining 50% are sellers for a
compatible aggregate quantity, will support a steady state price in a call auction market but not in a double auction market. What
matters here is the sequential arrival of traders. When the probability of having sequences of traders on the same side of the market
increases, there will be an accumulation of limit orders that will freeze the market. The arrival of a sequence of traders willing to
trade in the opposite direction will eventually produce a big price jump.
zActually, under this regime, for sufﬁciently long updating time interval, the population becomes less heterogeneous when the
number of groups is high. In this case, when a group is extracted a small number of agents will receive different target allocations.
Given the low extraction probability of each group, if the updating frequency is low enough, a high proportion of the population
will converge towards the target portfolio. Thus, a large number of agents will tend to trade in the same direction when
prices change.
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Figure 2. Cumulative distribution of the standardized log-returns for the STNU, STU, BANU and BAU settings (clockwise). The
fat tails of the log-returns distribution are more pronounced in the two right panels corresponding to the case of uniform updating
and, independently of the method used to update the target allocations, in the simple trading setting.
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analysis setting agents can choose between fully satisfy
their trading needs at market prices and post a limit
order (i.e. incur rationing). The choice depends on the
inferences they make about market imbalance. The
agents’ order-type submission strategy makes the accu-
mulation of limit orders on one side of the market less
pronounced. Therefore, rationing will occur less fre-
quently and, with respect to the simple trading setting,
we will observe more frequent, and wider, price changes
around the average and less frequent extreme jumps.
In table 2 we report the average daily spreads of twenty
simulations with G¼ 20, I¼ 40 and N¼ 3. We can clearly
see that the average daily spread increases substantially
in the book analysis setting.
In ﬁgure 5 we report separately the left and right tail of
the distribution of standardized log-returns generated
under uniform updating in the simple and in the book-
analysis setting. We notice that the typical log-returns
Table 2. Average daily spread computed, for each asset in every
setting, over twenty simulations with parameters G ¼ 20
and I ¼ 40.
Model Asset1 Asset2 Asset3 Average
STNU 5.563 5.564 5.556 5.561
STU 5.875 5.864 5.987 5.909
BANU 17.847 17.840 17.922 17.870
BAU 19.114 19.100 19.650 19.288
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Figure 3. The left panels report the coeﬃcient measuring the slope of the merged tails of the cumulative distribution of standardized
log-returns for the STU and the BAU settings. The slope coeﬃcients are computed for the series generated in an economy with three
risky assets. For every combination of parameters (G ¼ 10, 20, 50 and I ¼ 10, 20, 30, 40), we report the values for the three assets in
ten simulations (thirty points). We can see a clear increasing trend both with respect to longer updating time intervals and with
respect to a reduction in the number of groups. The two right panels compare the uniform and the non-uniform regimes, and show
that the fat tails become more pronounced in the uniform updating case.
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Figure 4. Tail slope coeﬃcients computed under the uniform
regime for ten series generated in an economy with three risky
assets for G ¼ 10, 20 and I ¼ 10, 20, 30, 40. The comparison
shows that the fat tails of the log-returns distribution increase
when moving from the book analysis to the simple trading
framework.
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series generated with our simulator presents a tendency
towards a more pronounced low tail.
The asymmetry of the unconditional distribution of
stock return has been widely debated both empirically
and theoretically. The empirical evidence documents
negative skewness and asymmetric volatility of stock-
market returns (see Gallant et al. 1992, Chen et al.
2001, Engle and Patton 2001), though the pervasiveness
of the phenomenon is still an open question (see
Peiro` 2004). On the theoretical side, most of the
proposed explanations assumed a representative-investor
frameworky. Recently Hong and Stein (2003) have pro-
vided an explanation based on investor heterogeneity. In
their model the negative skewness of market returns is
determined by the interaction of diﬀerences of opinion
about the fundamental value of the assets and market
frictions due to short sales constraints. Interestingly,
their model implies a relation between trading volume
and asymmetric volatility.
As stressed by Peiro`:
‘[. . .] departures of the coeﬃcient of skewness from
zero must be understood as rejections of normality,
rather than rejections of asymmetry [. . .] in order to
test for symmetry distribution-free procedures
should be used.’
(Peiro` 2004, p. 38)
We implement two diﬀerent non-parametric tests.
First, we examine the whole density function of returns
computing the excess returns with respect to the mean
and then comparing the distribution of negative excess
returns with the distribution of positive excess returns.
We divide absolute excess returns in seven classes and
we perform a likelihood ratio test to verify if the two
groups of data are signiﬁcantly diﬀerentz. We perform
the test on all the simulated series and we always reject
the null at a signiﬁcance level not greater than 1%.
To look closely at the tails of the distribution we follow
the procedure suggested by Peiro` (2004). We select the
twenty most extreme excess movements, and we test the
null hypothesis that the probabilities of the most extreme
returns being negative or positive are not diﬀerent§. We
run the test on the series generated in twenty simulation
runs of the simple trading setting with uniform updating,
three assets, G¼ 20 and I¼ 40. In all cases but two
(58 series) we get a p value lower than 0.05. We run the
same test changing the number of risky assets of
the economy. In ﬁgure 6 we compare the p values of the
case of one single risky asset, with those relative to the
case of three and six risky assets respectively.
Interestingly, we observe that the p values decrease as
the number of risky assets increases. Thus, the evidence
suggests that, ceteris paribus, the asymmetry of the tails
yWe are referring to the leverage effects theory (Black 1976, Christie 1982), to the volatility feedback mechanism (Pindyck 1984,
Campbell and Hentschel 1992) and to the bubble models (Blanchard and Watson 1982).
zThe null hypothesis that the two groups are sampled from the same population is tested using the following statistic,
T ¼ 2
X
i
X
j
nij log
nij
mij
 
, ð15Þ
where nij is the observed number of cases categorized in the ith row of the jth column, while mij is the number of cases expected in the
ith row of the jth column when H0 is true. The values of the statistic are distributed asymptotically as a 
2 with df ¼ ðr 1Þðc 1Þ,
where r and c are respectively the number of rows and the number of columns of the contingency table (in our test r ¼ 2 and c ¼ 7).
§The p value of the test is computed as follows,
p ¼ 2 1 maxðn
, nþÞ þ 0:5 npﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
npð1 pÞp
 ! !
, ð16Þ
where n and nþ are the number of negative and positive excess returns, while  is the cumulative standard normal distribution
function.
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Figure 5. Cumulative distribution of standardized log-returns for the STU and the BAU settings showing left and right
tail separately.
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of the stock returns distribution becomes more pro-
nounced as the number of assets included in the agents’
portfolios increases.
We conjecture that the negative skewness (specially in
the tails of the distribution) is due to the interplay
between agents ﬁnancial constraints and the frictions
generated by the trading mechanism. As a matter of
fact, in our model, jumps in prices and returns are deter-
mined by the arrival of sequences of traders on the same
side of the book. Big positive/negative jumps occur with
the arrival of sequences of buyers/sellers that match with
a series of diﬀerent sell/buy limit orders. Clearly, two
conditions must be veriﬁed to get big jumps: there must
be several limit orders listed in the book and the corre-
sponding quantities must be relatively small with respect
to the arriving contrarian market orders. Otherwise, even
if a sequence of agents willing to trade on the same side of
the market arrives, traders will tend to match with the
ﬁrst few limit orders and no big deviation in price will
be observed. Since the budget constraint can scale down
or even cancel buy orders while it does not aﬀect sell
orders, for a given distribution of target allocations across
agents, sell limit orders will tend to be more numerous
and for bigger quantities than buy limit orders. Moreover,
the order size of sell limit orders relative to the order
size of opposite market orders will be on average bigger
than the relative order size of buy limit orders. Therefore,
downside price movements will tend to happen more
often than upside price changes. In addition, since the
down and up movements, respectively on the bid and
ask side of the book, depend on the order size of arriving
opposite market orders, the negative skewness will
increase with trading volume.
The statistics reported in table 3 conﬁrm our expecta-
tions. The average order size of limit orders to sell is
higher than the average order size of limit order to buy.
Moreover, the ratio of the average order size of limit
orders to sell with respect to contrarian market orders
is higher than the corresponding ratio of limit orders to
buy with respect to market orders to sell. The above
diﬀerences increase when moving from the single risky
asset case to the case where portfolios are composed of
six risky assets and in the uniform case.
To examine the behaviour of volatility, in ﬁgure 7, we
plot the price changes with respect to classes in increasing
order of standardized log-volume. We observe that, as
we move to volume classes corresponding to bigger
deviations from the average volume, the volatility of
price changes increases and the relative frequency of big
negative price changes goes up.
The pervasiveness of the non-normality of the daily
log-returns time series, together with the qualitative
and quantitative diﬀerences detected in the proposed
Table 3. For G ¼ 20 and I ¼ 40 and for each market setting, the
table reports the ratios between the mean per-order volume of
limit to contrarian market orders (LOS=MOB and LOB=MOS),
and the ratios representing the mean per-order volume of buy
and sell limit orders (VLOS=NLOS and VLOB=NLOB). For
each asset we compute the mean over 4000 days. The values
reported are averages over twenty simulation runs. For the STU
setting we report the values corresponding to an economy with
one single risky asset, and to a multi-securities economy with
three and six risky assets respectively.
Model Asset LOS
/MOB
LOB
/MOS
VLOS
/NLOS
VLOB
/NLOB
1 2.61 2.56 32.77 27.00
STNU 2 2.61 2.58 32.77 27.01
3 2.61 2.57 32.69 27.04
1 2.00 2.01 20.67 19.00
1 2.33 2.23 24.12 19.23
2 2.36 2.21 24.59 19.33
3 2.34 2.25 23.58 18.85
1 2.53 2.37 25.43 18.97
STU 2 2.56 2.37 26.35 19.37
3 2.51 2.33 25.33 18.65
4 2.47 2.32 24.25 18.56
5 2.52 2.30 24.88 18.06
6 2.54 2.35 26.18 19.20
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Figure 6. Sorted p values of the tails asymmetry test for twenty simulation runs of the STU setting with G¼ 20 and I¼ 40.
The continuous line represents the case of a market with one single risky asset. The dotted lines correspond to the p values generated
in the case of a three risky asset economy (left panel) and in the case of an economy with six risky assets (right panel).
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alternative settings, strongly supports the idea that the
institutional environment deﬁned by a continuous auction
order-driven market aﬀects signiﬁcantly the distribution
of short term log-returns. The price dynamics depends
on the intensity of rationing induced by the trading
mechanismy.
Our analyses show that there is a clear relation between
the shape of the distribution of daily log-returns and
the intensity of rationing generated by the sequential
matching trading mechanism. In particular, the negative
asymmetry of the log-returns distribution is strictly
related to the interplay between individual wealth
constraints and the liquidity constraints generated by
the market mechanism.
Finally, we examine the stock returns correlation
structure. In table 4 we report the average Spearman
correlations over twenty simulations with parameters
G¼ 20, N¼ 3 and I¼ 40.
We notice two interesting facts. First, the average
correlations are signiﬁcantly positive at least at the 1%
level. Second, the correlations increase in the settings
where the induced rationing is stronger, that is in
the simple trading framework and under the uniform-
updating regime.
In our model with uninformed traders and random
exogenous order ﬂow, the only way for an association
structure to arise is through the wealth eﬀect due to
the traders’ objective of maintaining well-balanced
portfoliosz. When in the market there is more rationing,
a higher proportion of traders will maintain over time
j’s signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and of the same
sign. The wealth eﬀect will cumulate across agents and
produce a stronger aggregate impact on prices.
3.2. The temporal pattern of the
simulated ﬁnancial time series
We analyse here the temporal properties of the simulated
series. For all our series the Augmented Dickey–Fuller
(ADF) test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root in
the log-returns series. To check for IID, or at least uncor-
related, log-price changes we perform the variance ratio
test (VR). For all the series the VR statistic computed at
diﬀerent lags is signiﬁcantly lower than one, rejecting the
random walk hypothesis§. Correspondingly, the Ljung–
Box Q-test consistently rejects the hypothesis of no serial
correlation in the time series of log-returns.
Figures 8 and 9 show the sample autocorrelations at
diﬀerent lags of the volatility and the volume time series.
All the series present signiﬁcant serial correlations at
diﬀerent lags which become more pronounced when
moving from the non-uniform to the uniform case.
Moreover, the volume series show a clear tendency
towards an accentuation of the temporal dependence in
the simple trading setting.
The log-returns series, ﬁgure 10, presents negative
short-term serial correlations that tend to become
stronger in the book analysis setting.
When the randomly assigned target allocations are
the same for all the agents in the selected group, large
demand/supply imbalances become more probable.
Rationed agents will keep issuing similar orders until
they can ﬁnd a match, thus creating memory eﬀects in
volume that are ampliﬁed by an increase in the intensity
of the induced rationing. The temporal behaviour of the
log-returns and volatility series can be explained by the
interaction of two diﬀerent forces. On the one hand,
rationing implies that prices do not fully adjust to reﬂect
market imbalances. Accordingly, prices will continue to
adjust through time generating persistence in volatility.
Over time the propagation eﬀect will be more persistent
Table 4. Average Spearman correlation coeﬃcient between
daily returns. The average is taken, for each asset in every
setting, over twenty simulations with parameters G ¼ 20
and I ¼ 40.
Model 12 13 23
STNU 0.11 0.12 0.13
STU 0.18 0.20 0.19
BANU 0.08 0.07 0.10
BAU 0.11 0.12 0.11
yOur conjecture is further supported by the result we obtain when we run our simulations without the entering probability. As we
mentioned above, the second step ﬁlter we impose increases the mean and reduces the dispersion of the order size probability
distribution. Accordingly, the sequential matching of orders will produce less rationing. As expected, we observe an attenuation of
the non-normality of the stock returns distribution when we introduce the entering probability.
zFor every agent, for every asset j, j increases when the price of another asset goes up, @j=@Pi  0 for i 6¼ j:
§We use both the standard variance ratio test and the heteroskedasticity-consistent variance ratio test, and we always get results
consistent with rejection of the null hypothesis of random walk price increments.
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Figure 7. Log-price changes, for the BAU setting, relative to
volume classes in increasing order of standardized log-volume:
(1) vi  3, (2) 3 < vi  1:5, (3) 1:5 < vi  0:5, (4)
0:5 < vi  0, (5) 0 < vi  0:5, (6) 0:5 < vi  1:5, (7)
1:5 < vi  3 and (8) vi  3:0. For each volume class, we report
the mean price change and the interval corresponding to 	2.
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Figure 8. Autocorrelation function of volatility for STNU, STU, BANU and BAU (clockwise). The volatility series are more
persistent in the uniform updating cases.
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Figure 9. Autocorrelation function of volume for STNU, STU, BANU and BAU (clockwise). The serial correlation of volume
becomes higher in the uniform updating case and is more pronounced in the simple trading setting.
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in those settings where rationing is more intense. On the
other hand, since agents trade to adjust their portfolio
allocations according to target allocations, when, for a
given asset, the price increases, for all agents the diﬀer-
ence between the amount that should be invested in
that asset and the amount currently invested decreasesy.
Therefore, big price movements will induce contrarian
trades that, in turn, will generate short-term negative
serial correlation in log-returns and positive short-term
correlation in volatility. The short-term serial correlation
of log-returns and volatility is more pronounced in the
book analysis setting where the average bid–ask spread
is higher and the magnitude of price ﬂuctuations is
greater.
In ﬁgure 11 we plot the sample cross-correlations
between volume and the absolute value of log-price
changes. Clearly, the persistence of the cross-correlation
over time is closely related to the intensity of the rationing
induced by the trading mechanism.
4. Conclusions
We have modelled an artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market with
multiple risky assets where agents trade to reach target
portfolio allocations exogenously assigned, subject to
a budget constraint. Agents are homogeneous in terms
of trading strategy, nevertheless the market is maintained
viable by assigning to the agents diﬀerent target
allocations over time. The trading mechanism replicates
the functioning of a continuous auction order-driven
market.
We show that the institutional setting of a double
auction market is suﬃcient to generate a non-normal
distribution of price changes and temporal patterns that
resemble those observed in real markets.
We can summarize our results as follows.
(a) The daily log-returns series we generate exhibit fat
tails, excess kurtosis and negative skewness. The
deviations from normality become more evident in
those setting where the rationing induced by the
trading mechanism is stronger (the simple trading
setting and the uniform updating case). Therefore,
we provide signiﬁcant evidence supporting the idea
that the institutional structure of the market plays
an important role in determining the distribution
of short-term price changes. The generated distri-
butions of log-returns become closer to those
observed in real markets, when we reduce agents’
heterogeneity, creating groups of agents with similar
trading needs.
Our model suggests that it is not necessary to
introduce heterogeneity in agents’ trading strategies
to generate the non-normality of the log-returns
y@j=@Pj  0 for j ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,N.
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Figure 10. Autocorrelation function of log-returns for STNU, STU, BANU and BAU (clockwise). We note that the negative serial
correlation in log-returns becomes more pronounced in the book analysis setting (bottom panels).
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distribution. The sequential matching system of a
double auction market can by itself produce anom-
alous price dynamics when the random order-ﬂow is
such to increase the probability of having sequences
of traders on the same side of the market.
(b) Our multi-assets framework makes it possible to
derive some interesting insights about the role of
the budget constraint. We ﬁnd evidence of negative
skewness and a more pronounced low tail of the
daily distribution of log-returns, and we show that
the phenomenon is related to the interplay between
agents’ ﬁnancial constraints and the frictions gener-
ated by the trading mechanism. In addition, even
in our framework where order-ﬂow is exogenous
and independent of market relevant information,
we detect positive returns correlations associated
with the intensity of rationing induced by the trading
system.
(c) Our model generates ﬁnancial time series whose
temporal pattern resembles the actual behaviour
of real ﬁnancial time series: serial correlation in
volatility, in volume, and positive cross-correlation
between volume and the absolute value of price
changes. The detected temporal patterns become
more pronounced in the market settings where the
intensity of rationing induced by the trading
mechanism increases.
In closing, we underline that the current framework
represents a basic set-up where we examined how prices
respond to order-ﬂow in a double auction market. In our
multi-assets model order-ﬂows are exogenously deter-
mined and do not depend on information about funda-
mentals or market-wide conditions. Of course, in reality
order-ﬂow rates depend on information and assumptions
about agents’ utility. To develop a sensible multiple secu-
rities market model, the connections between agents’
choices and the process of information production and
diﬀusion must be addressed. We have chosen to follow
a two-step procedure to attack such a complex issue.
First, we have examined how a multi-assets works for
given order-ﬂow rates. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that a multi-
assets market presents peculiar characteristics even in
this simpliﬁed setting. We highlight that the interaction
of the trading mechanism with wealth constraints creates
some feedbacks aﬀecting signiﬁcantly the stock returns
distributions of single risky assets. The introduction of
the book-analysis setting allowed us to move in the direc-
tion of modelling the information ﬂow and to qualify our
results. Allowing agents to choose to be liquidity deman-
ders or liquidity suppliers on the basis of the public screen
information, we have performed the ﬁrst step to switch
from a model where agents’ behaviour is random and
exogenously determined to a model where agents’ choices
are dependent on information and based on economic
criteria.
The ﬁnal step requires to make order-ﬂow dependent
on information. We are working to introduce endogen-
ously determined target allocations. In this new setting,
investors will consider the past to be informative about
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Figure 11. Cross-correlations of volume and absolute value of price changes for STNU, STU, BANU and BAU (clockwise).
The cross-correlations are more persistent in the uniform updating case and in the simple trading setting.
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the future, and they will determine their target allocations
on the basis of their estimates of expected prices condi-
tional on current information. In particular, we are deﬁn-
ing a framework where agents learn about the joint
probability distribution of assets returns, and conse-
quently determine optimal portfolio allocations. Such a
framework will open the possibility to analyse the
dynamics of aggregate stock-market returns and to inves-
tigate how market-wide price movements, and related
contagion eﬀects, can arise.
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